International Trade and Income Inequality[*]

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Abstract

We propose a simple theory that shows a mechanism through which international trade entails wage and job polarization. We consider two countries in which individuals with different abilities work either as knowledge workers, who develop differentiated products, or as production workers, who engage in production. In equilibrium, *ex ante* symmetric firms attract knowledge workers with different abilities, which create firm heterogeneity in product quality. Market integration disproportionately benefits firms that produce high-quality products. This winner-take-all trend of product markets causes war for talents, which exacerbates income inequality within the countries and leads to labor-market polarization.

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1   Introduction

It has been widely recognized that income inequality has increased significantly in many countries (e.g., Blau and Kahn, 1996; Card *et al.*, 2013; and Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). In Britain, for example, "chief executives can expect to receive average compensation in excess of £4.5m ($ 6.9m) this year. Pay at the top grew by over 300% between 1998 and 2010. At the same time, the median British worker's real wage has been pretty stagnant. These trends mean the ratio of executive to average pay at FTSE 100 firms jumped from 47 to 120 times in 12 years." (*The Economist*, January 14th-20th, 2012, p. 11) It has also been well documented that job polarization has occurred in many developed countries, including the United States and some European nations, such that the shares of employment in high-skilled and low-skilled occupations grow while that of middle-wage occupation declines; polarization of earnings, as well as employment polarization, has also been observed (Autor *et al.* 2008 and Acemoglu and Autor 2011). Outsourcing, skill-biased technological change, and weak labor unions have been named as causes of income inequality. Autor *et al.* (2003) further argue that computers replace workers in performing cognitive and routine manual tasks while complementing workers in performing nonroutine tasks. This routine-biased technological change is considered to be a cause of job polarization (e.g., Autor *et al.*, 2006, 2008).

We cannot also overstate the importance of globalization as one of the causes of job polarization, or, more broadly, income inequality within countries. Keller and Utar (2016) report that in Denmark import competition (mostly with products from China) is a major cause of job polarization (the shift of employment from mid-wage manufacturing to low-wage services and high-wage jobs). They conclude that rising import competition accounts for about 16% of the increased income inequality between 1999 and 2009, mostly due to the employment shift (both upward and downward moves from mid-wage jobs) rather than the observed wage polarization. Interestingly, they also find evidence that import competition causes a decline in mid-wage jobs together with a growth of high-wage and low-wage job, while offshoring and technical change cannot explain high-wage and low-wage job growth, respectively. Exporting, as well as importing, can cause income inequality. Bernard and Jensen (1997) find that

the wage gap between non-production and production workers increased in the 1980s and that exporting plants contribute heavily to this change. Baumgarten (2013) and Danziger (2017) also document that the wage premium in exporting establishments is higher than domestic ones. As for the impact of globalization in general, Autor and Dorn (2013), Goos *et al.* (2009, 2014), and Michaels *et al.* (2014) find that openness to trade and offshoring have contributed to income inequality, albeit less so than the routine-biased technological change.

International trade in goods has a large impact on industries and in turn on the labor market.[1] This study proposes a simple theory to show that growing international trade in goods exacerbates within-country income inequality and can cause job polarization; the model can explain in particular that the real incomes for the top income earners and the lowest income earners rise while those for the middle-income class decline.[2]

Thanks to the ICT (information and communication technology) revolution, it has become much easier for consumers to access detailed product information and to make comparisons between similar products. As a result even a small difference in product quality can lead to a large differential in firms' profitability within industries: firms that sell high-quality products command disproportionately high market shares. But this winner-take-all trend of product markets causes war for talents, since what determines the product quality is the talents of knowledge workers, such as managers and R&D workers. Consequently, knowledge workers in winning firms earn disproportionately high income as a rent for their talents. A greater opportunity of international trade amplifies this effect. A decrease in trade costs (including marketing and other costs in foreign countries), also caused mostly by the ICT revolution, has increased the volume of world trade. The proliferation of international trade

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[1]Autor *et al.* (2013) estimate that import competition from China explains 1/4 of the contemporaneous aggregate decline in US manufacturing employment. Burstein and Vogel (2010) estimate that globalization (i.e., trade in goods and multinational production) accounts for 1/9 of the 24% rise in the US skill premium between 1966 and 2006.

[2]A growing share of the middle-income class serves as an engine of economic growth. This class also plays an important role in political stability (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). So a decline in the middle-income class may have serious economic and political consequences. Autor, *et al.* (2017) also find evidence that in the United States, growing exposure to Chinese import competition engendered political polarization, such that districts subject to greater import competition became less likely to elect a moderate Democrat and more likely to elect a conservative Republican, leaving few centrists in either party.

naturally widens profit differentials among firms within industries and hence widens income inequality between and within different skill groups.

To show this phenomenon, we build a two-country variant of Lucas's (1978) model in which *ex ante* symmetric firms in a representative differentiated-good (manufacturing) sector hire knowledge workers with different abilities, thereby producing products with different qualities. Firms also hire production workers to produce their products. We assume that workers are homogeneous in their productivities when hired as production workers despite the difference in their abilities. In equilibrium, knowledge workers are sorted into different firms according to their abilities; firms that hire a group of highly-talented knowledge workers produce high-quality products, while those that hire mediocre knowledge workers produce low-quality products. The wage gap may arise between knowledge workers and production workers within a firm, which is particularly serious for profitable firms that produce high-quality products.

International trade affects firms' profitability differently. Top-tier firms that produce high-quality products are the winners of globalization; getting access to additional markets gives them large benefits. The medium-tier and lowest-tier firms, on the other hand, lose from globalization. They suffer from foreign top-tier firms' penetration into their own market. Although the medium-tier firms may sell their products to foreign markets as well as their own, additional export profits after the subtraction of fixed costs of export are not enough to offset the loss that they incur in their domestic market. The lowest-tier firms are forced to exit due to the intensified competition in the domestic market. Consequently, top income earners who are the most talented and work for the top-tier exporting firms benefit from opening to trade; they are the winners of globalization. On the contrary, workers in the middle-income class, who work as knowledge workers in the middle-tier and lowest-tier firms, are likely to suffer from opening to trade. Their incomes fall because the profits for the firms in which they are working fall after trade liberalization. Some workers with intermediate abilities may also drop from the pool of knowledge workers to the pool of production workers, thereby receiving lower wages, as the weakest firms exit from the market. Although the real

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wages for the middle-income class may still rise thanks to the increased varieties of products available for consumption after trade liberalization, we show that under a relatively mild condition their real wages unambiguously decline by opening to trade. Indeed, workers in the middle-income class are the only losers from trade liberalization. The real wages for the least talented workers, who work as production workers, increase when the country opens to trade, thanks to the increased varieties of consumption.

As a corollary to this theoretical consequence of globalization, we obtain a testable prediction that the wage gap between knowledge and production workers expands within the top-tier firms while it shrinks within others. Verhoogen (2008) finds evidence that is consistent with this prediction. He documents that exchange rate devaluation during the peso crisis of 1993-1997 induced more productive Mexican plants to increase exports and raise wages, especially for white-collar wages. In this phase, within-firm wage difference between white-collar and blue-collar workers widens for more productive firms, suggesting that exporting induces firms to upgrade product quality and reward white-collar workers disproportionately. Friedrich (2015) also finds evidence from Danish data that trade induces exporting firms to increase sales, add more layers of hierarchy, and increase wage inequality within those firms. He also documents that even when controlling for the number of hierarchical layers, an increase in sales leads to a widening of within-firm wage inequality.

After presenting our main results of the paper in the baseline model with two symmetric countries, we also extend the model in Section V to the case where countries are asymmetric in the population size and ability distribution. We find through numerical simulations that international trade exacerbates income inequality within the countries. Income inequality in the trade equilibrium is greater in the smaller country in the case of population asymmetry, while it is greater in the talent-abundant country in the case of ability-distribution asymmetry. In the online appendix, we conduct a simple empirical analysis and find from the data for the OECD countries in the period of 1979-2014 that, based on column (4) in the appendix table (which includes both country and year fixed effect), trade increases income inequality but less so in larger countries, as predicted by the model. However, these effects

are not statistically significant.[3]

We are certainly not the first to theoretically predict that international trade widens wage gap across different income groups. Blanchard and Willmann (2016), Costinot and Vogel (2010), Helpman *et al.* (2010a,b), Helpman *et al.* (2016), Manasse and Turrini (2001), Sampson (2014), and Yeaple (2005) among others show in their respective models that international trade in goods widens wage gap within countries.[4] Among these studies, Manasse and Turrini (2001) and Yeaple (2005) are the closest to our paper.

Manasse and Turrini (2001) employ the same basic model structure as ours; *ex ante* symmetric firms produce products of different qualities because they are run by entrepreneurs with different skills. They show, among other things, that skill earnings in non-exporting firms are reduced relative to those in exporting firms as a result of further trade integration. In their analysis, however, the mass of entrepreneurs (i.e., workers with skills), which is equal to the mass of firms in the differentiated-good industry by construction, is fixed and it is not affected by opening to trade. As a consequence, they cannot analyze how trade liberalization affects individual worker's occupational choice when trade induces weak firms to exit from the market. This channel is important when we assess the impact of trade liberalization on wage distribution within countries, because the winner-take-all trend in product markets is reinforced by globalization, thereby reducing the number of firms in each industry and reducing knowledge workers' jobs in the middle-income class. In addition, their model does not show that international trade adversely affects the middle-income class.

Yeaple (2005) derives similar predictions to ours in a similar model environment. In his model, firms choose both their individual production technologies and the types of workers. A distinguishing feature of his model is the complementarity between the technology and skills of labor; high-productivity technology is matched with high-skilled workers. Among other things, he shows that a reduction in trade costs *may* decrease the real wage of moderately skilled workers. Beside the fact that the endogenously-determined average talent of

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[3]To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper that empirically examines how the effect of trade liberalization on income inequality is related to the country size.

[4]See Grossman (2013) for a thought-provoking survey on the impact of international trade on labor markets.

knowledge workers is the only source of firm heterogeneity in our model, our model is different from his in the important aspect that we separate labor into two endogenously allocated categories: knowledge workers and production workers. This distinction is a key to our analysis. First, we can discuss the differential effects of trade on workers within firms, which is another important wage gap besides the wage gap within sectors and within occupations. Second, we can show that under the mild condition (on the elasticity of substitution) the real incomes *unambiguously* fall as a result of globalization for some workers in the middle-income class because they drop out of the pool of knowledge workers and work as production workers after trade is liberalized. Third, and more broadly, separating knowledge workers from production workers is critical in understanding the effect of globalization on the labor market. Knowledge can be embedded into products so that it is duplicated limitlessly with the help of capital and production workers, allowing firms to possibly earn a fortune in the global market. Globalization does not necessarily increase the demand for knowledge workers. (Indeed, our model predicts that demand decreases as a result of globalization.) It only increases the demand for talent. Knowledge created by a limited number of knowledge workers is embedded in the products and travels all over the world.

Monte (2011) and Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) also extend Lucas's (1978) model to examine the impact of international trade on income distribution. Since their interest is slightly different from ours, they do not show that trade reduces the real wage of the middle-income class.

We believe that our model is the simplest one to show the adverse effect of trade on the middle-income class, while capturing the important aspects of globalization: the winner-take-all market and war for talents. Our model, which incorporates workers' occupational choice, can show that international trade entails labor market polarization that involves the occupational shift from a knowledge-worker job to a production job. It can also show that trade increases within-firm wage gaps in large exporting firms while it decreases wage gaps in smaller firms. In addition, the model is extended to the case of asymmetric countries to show numerically that trade exacerbates income inequality, particularly in small countries.

2 The Model

We consider a model with two countries (countries 1 and 2), one good (a differentiated good with many varieties), and one production factor (labor). The differentiated good consists of a continuum of varieties, each of which (denoted by $\omega \in \Omega$) is produced by a firm under monopolistic competition. Product quality, which is represented by $\alpha(\omega)$, may differ across varieties. Following Manasse and Turrini (2001) and Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), we represent a representative consumer's preferences by the utility function:

$$u = \left[\int_{\Omega} \alpha(\omega)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} x(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\omega \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \tag{1}$$

where $x(\omega)$ denotes the consumption level of a variety ω and $\sigma > 1$ denotes the elasticity of substitution. The higher the $\alpha(\omega)$, the higher the utility a consumer derives from the consumption of variety ω.

In each country $i = 1, 2$, there is a continuum of workers with the mass L_i; each worker provides 1 unit of labor. Labor is the only production factor in this economy. But a worker is employed either as a knowledge worker to develop a product or as a production worker to produce the good. We choose labor provided by production workers as the numeraire. Workers are heterogeneous in their abilities, which only matter when they are hired as knowledge workers. Thus, they are heterogeneous as knowledge workers, but homogenous as production workers. In the baseline model, ability is measured by $a \geq a_0$ (where $a_0 > 0$ is the lowest ability), the distribution of which in country i is represented by the cumulative distribution function G_i with the probability density function g_i. The mass of workers with their abilities less than or equal to a is, therefore, given by $L_i G_i(a)$. In the baseline model, we assume that countries 1 and 2 are symmetric: that is, $L_1 = L_2 = L$ and $G_1(a) = G_2(a) = G(a)$ for all $a \geq a_0$.

The goods market is under monopolistic competition with free entry and exit. To enter, firms need to develop a product by hiring l knowledge workers, which serves as an entry cost. The average ability of these workers determines the quality of the product; we simply assume that the quality of the product $\alpha(\omega)$ is equal to the average ability of the knowledge

workers employed in the firm. Production itself requires only production workers; 1 unit of labor produces 1 unit of the good.

There is no friction in the labor markets for either knowledge workers or production workers, nor does there exist any information asymmetry between workers and firms about individual workers' abilities. Since the average ability of knowledge workers determines the product quality, firms in the differentiated good sector compete for talent. They post wages for knowledge workers, and workers apply for those positions; we assume that each firm offers a wage that is common to every knowledge worker within the firm, regardless of the workers' abilities.[5] Then, each firm chooses l workers from those who have applied.

In equilibrium, matching between firms and knowledge workers must be stable. As a consequence of the competition among firms, the entire operating profits for each firm are given as a rent to the knowledge workers. Therefore, given that the average ability of knowledge workers determines the product quality and that they receive the same wage within the firms, they have a strong incentive to be matched with other knowledge workers with abilities that are greater than or equal to their own. As a result, knowledge workers are sorted into the firms according to their abilities. Since the most talented workers are in limited supply, the firms post different wages for knowledge workers, attracting workers with different abilities. Workers are sorted according to their abilities such that workers with the highest abilities are hired by the firms that post highest wages. Then, it follows from the assumption of a continuum of workers that all knowledge workers in a firm will have a common ability. Letting $w(\omega)$ denote the knowledge workers' wage (or rent) in the firm that produces the variety ω and $\tilde{\pi}(\omega)$ denote the firm's operating profits, we therefore have

$$w(\omega)l = \tilde{\pi}(\omega). \tag{2}$$

Firms produce varieties of different qualities in equilibrium. The exogenously-given ability distribution determines the firm distribution with respect to their product quality, since

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[5]We will show that in equilibrium, the abilities of knowledge workers are the same within the firms. If we assume, alternatively, that a firm posts a wage profile that possibly assigns a higher wage to a worker with a higher ability, we would have another equilibrium in which a firm attracts workers with different abilities. But such equilibrium would disappear if (even a slight) complementarity between knowledge workers is introduced. We make this assumption of common wage to avoid unnecessary complications.

workers are sorted according to their abilities and the average ability of knowledge workers determines the product quality. The distribution of workers with respect to their abilities is characterized by a density function of $Lg(a)$. Since all knowledge workers in a firm will have a common ability, the density of firms that produce varieties of quality α, which is denoted by $f(\alpha)$, is given by

$$f(\alpha) = \frac{Lg(\alpha)}{l}. \tag{3}$$

Workers who are not hired as knowledge workers will work as production workers. In equilibrium, there will be a cutoff ability α^* such that all workers with $a \geq \alpha^*$ work as knowledge workers, while all workers with $a < \alpha^*$ work as production workers. Once α^* is given, together with (3), the product quality distribution of operating firms is completely determined.

3 Autarkic Equilibrium

This section derives the autarkic equilibrium and shows that knowledge workers receive higher wages than production workers and that their wages increase proportionately with their abilities. Thanks to the symmetry assumed in the baseline model, we need only consider a representative country to derive the autarkic equilibrium.

First, we use a consumer's (or worker's) demands derived from (1) to obtain a firm's production level and profits. Since the wage rate of production workers is normalized to 1, each firm optimally selects the price $p(\alpha) = \sigma/(\sigma - 1)$, the constant mark-up price over the marginal cost of 1, regardless of its product quality α. Consequently, the firm that produces a variety of quality α sells

$$x(\alpha) = \frac{\alpha p(\alpha)^{-\sigma}}{\int_{\alpha^*}^{\infty} \alpha' p(\alpha')^{1-\sigma} f(\alpha') d\alpha'} I = \frac{\alpha}{\int_{\alpha^*}^{\infty} \alpha' f(\alpha') d\alpha'} \frac{(\sigma - 1)I}{\sigma} \tag{4}$$

units of the good, where I denotes the aggregate income of the country. The higher the quality of its product or the smaller the quality index (denoted by $\int_{\alpha^*}^{\infty} \alpha' f(\alpha') d\alpha'$), the higher the production level of the firm. The operating profits for the firm that produces a

product with quality α are given by

$$\tilde{\pi}(\alpha) = \frac{\alpha I}{\sigma \int_{\alpha^*}^{\infty} \alpha' f(\alpha') d\alpha'}. \tag{5}$$

Henceforth, we identify a firm by the quality of its product rather than $\omega \in \Omega$, since all firms that produce a good of the same quality have common characteristics.

Let $w(\alpha)$ denote the wage for a knowledge worker with ability $a = \alpha$, who is hired by the firm that produces the product of quality α (with a slight abuse of notation). We can write the profits for the firm as

$$\pi(\alpha) = \tilde{\pi}(\alpha) - w(\alpha)l.$$

If $\pi(\alpha)$ is strictly positive for some firm with α, an entrant would post a slightly higher wage than $w(\alpha)$ and get all the knowledge workers from that firm and operate profitably. Therefore, $\pi(\alpha) = 0$ in equilibrium, so that the knowledge workers' wage schedule is given by $w(\alpha) = \tilde{\pi}(\alpha)/l$, as (2) indicates.

The equilibrium is characterized by the two conditions: the free-entry (FE) condition and the labor-market clearing (LM) condition. The free-entry condition expresses that the operating profits for the cutoff firms with α^* are just large enough for them to pay the wage of 1 to each knowledge worker.[6] The knowledge workers in the cutoff firms earn the wage of 1, i.e., $w(\alpha^*) = 1$, since if $w(\alpha^*) > 1$ profitable entry by a firm that attracts knowledge workers with an ability slightly lower than α^* at the wage $[w(\alpha^*) + 1]/2$, for example, would arise. Thus, the free-entry condition can be written as

$$\frac{\alpha^* I}{\sigma \int_{\alpha^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha} = l. \tag{6}$$

The labor-market clearing condition, on the other hand, expresses that total labor demands, the sum of demands for knowledge workers and those for production workers, must equal the labor supply L. Total demands for knowledge workers are given by $l \int_{\alpha^*}^{\infty} f(\alpha) d\alpha$. Total demands for production workers equal $(\sigma - 1)I/\sigma$ as we can easily obtain from (4). Thus,

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[6]Note that α^* denotes both threshold ability for knowledge workers and the quality of the cutoff firms' products, since these firms that produce products of quality α^* hire knowledge workers with ability α^*.

Figure 1: Autarkic equilibrium

the labor-market clearing condition can be written as

$$l \int_{\alpha^*}^{\infty} f(\alpha)d\alpha + \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} I = L. \tag{7}$$

Figure 1 depicts the relationships between α^* and I that express the free-entry and labor-market clearing conditions. The free-entry condition is expressed by a negatively-sloped schedule FE, since the left-hand side of (6) increases with both α^* and I. The labor-market clearing condition, on the other hand, is expressed by a positively-sloped schedule LM, since the left-hand side of (7) decreases with α^* but increases with I. The intersection of these two schedules gives us the autarkic equilibrium values of α^* and I, which we call α_A^* and I_A.

Once the equilibrium threshold α_A^* is determined, the equilibrium wage schedule is readily obtained. As Figure 2 shows, wages are flat at 1 for all workers with abilities smaller than α_A^*. Their wages are 1 because they work as production workers. Those who have abilities greater than α_A^*, on the other hand, work as knowledge workers. Their wages are the rents for their abilities and are greater than 1, except for those whose ability levels are exactly equal to α_A^*. As we can see from (5), the ratio of wages for knowledge workers with any two different levels of abilities is equal to the ratio of their abilities itself:

$$\frac{w_A(\alpha)}{w_A(\alpha_A^*)} = \frac{\tilde{\pi}(\alpha)}{\tilde{\pi}(\alpha_A^*)} = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha_A^*},$$

where we can compare the wage for a knowledge worker with ability $a = \alpha$ with that for a knowledge worker with ability $a = \alpha_A^*$. It follows from $w_A(\alpha_A^*) = 1$ that we can write a

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Figure 2: Autarkic equilibrium wage schedule

worker's wage as a function of her ability:

$$w_A(a) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if} \quad a_0 \le a < \alpha_A^* \\ a/\alpha_A^* & \text{if} \quad a \ge \alpha_A^*. \end{cases}$$

We can view this result from the perspective of wage gaps within firms to obtain the following proposition.

Proposition 1 *The higher the quality of a firm's product and hence the larger the firm's size, the larger the wage gap between knowledge workers and production workers within the firm.*

The equilibrium utility for a worker, which can also be considered her real wage, can be readily derived. It is easy to infer from (4) that the worker with ability a consumes $\alpha(\sigma-1)w_A(a)/\sigma \int_{\alpha_A^*}^{\infty} \alpha' f(\alpha')d\alpha'$ units of each variety of quality $\alpha \ge \alpha_A^*$. Then it follows from (1) that the worker's indirect utility in the autarkic equilibrium is given by

$$u_A(a) = \frac{(\sigma-1)w_A(a)}{\sigma \left[\int_{\alpha_A^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha)d\alpha\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}}. \tag{8}$$

Not surprisingly, the equilibrium utility for an individual depends on both her wage and the quality index of the market.

4 Trade Equilibrium

Let us turn to the analysis of the impact of international trade on the firms' activities and the wage schedule in the individual countries. We suppose that firms incur f_X units of labor as the fixed cost of exporting. Exporting firms also incur iceberg trade cost such that they need to ship $\tau(>1)$ units of the good to supply 1 unit in the foreign market.

We consider a realistic case in which only a fraction of the firms export their products. Let α^X denote the threshold quality such that the products are exported (as well as supplied domestically) if and only if their individual product qualities are higher than or equal to α^X. It is easy to see that the operating profits from the domestic and foreign sales are given by

$$\tilde{\pi}_d(\alpha) = \frac{\alpha I}{\sigma \left[\int_{\alpha^*}^{\infty} \alpha' f(\alpha') d\alpha' + \tau^{1-\sigma} \int_{\alpha^X}^{\infty} \alpha' f(\alpha') d\alpha' \right]}, \tag{9}$$

$$\tilde{\pi}_X(\alpha) = \frac{\alpha \tau^{1-\sigma} I}{\sigma \left[\int_{\alpha^*}^{\infty} \alpha' f(\alpha') d\alpha' + \tau^{1-\sigma} \int_{\alpha^X}^{\infty} \alpha' f(\alpha') d\alpha' \right]}, \tag{10}$$

respectively. Then, the profits for the firm that produces a product of quality α are equal to

$$\pi(\alpha) = \begin{cases} \tilde{\pi}_d(\alpha) - w(\alpha)l & \text{if } \alpha^* \leq \alpha < \alpha^X \\ \tilde{\pi}_d(\alpha) + \tilde{\pi}_X(\alpha) - w(\alpha)l - f_X & \text{if } \alpha \geq \alpha^X. \end{cases} \tag{11}$$

Since the quality indices take the same value between the two countries due to the symmetry, it is easy to compare the operating profits from exporting and those from domestic sale. In particular, we compare the operating export profits for the export-cutoff firm with the product quality α^X, given by $\tilde{\pi}_X(\alpha^X) = f_X$, and the profits for the entry-cutoff firm with α^*, given by $\tilde{\pi}_d(\alpha^*) = l$. Then, it follows from (9) and (10) that the relationship between α^X and α^* can be expressed by the function:

$$\alpha^X(\alpha^*) = \frac{\tau^{\sigma-1} f_X}{l} \alpha^*. \tag{12}$$

We assume that $\tau^{\sigma-1} f_X > l$ so that only a fraction of the firms export their products.

The free-entry condition and the labor-market clearing condition can be written as

$$\frac{\alpha^* I}{\sigma \left[\int_{\alpha^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha + \tau^{1-\sigma} \int_{\alpha^X(\alpha^*)}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha \right]} = l, \tag{13}$$

$$l \int_{\alpha^*}^{\infty} f(\alpha) d\alpha + f_X \int_{\alpha^X(\alpha^*)}^{\infty} f(\alpha) d\alpha + \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} I = L, \tag{14}$$

Figure 3: Trade equilibrium

respectively. By comparing the free-entry condition (13) with the autarkic counterpart (6), we find that the FE schedule shifts up, as Figure 3 indicates. International trade intensifies the domestic competition. In order for the same threshold producer to break even, the total income must rise. Similarly, by comparing (14) with (7), we see that the LM schedule shifts down. The labor market becomes tighter because trade creates additional demands for labor that is used as a fixed input for exporting. Thus, the income must decrease so that these increased demands are offset by the decreased demands for production workers. As Figure 3 indicates, trade-equilibrium income denoted by I_T may be greater or smaller than I_A; i.e., the impact of trade on the total income is ambiguous. However, trade will unambiguously raise the threshold quality α_T^* (as in Melitz, 2003). International trade intensifies competition in individual domestic markets, which lowers the profitability of firms that only serve their individual domestic markets. In addition, the labor market becomes tighter due to the demands for labor for exporting. These two effects work as factors to increase the bar to enter the industry.

Proposition 2 *International trade raises the entry-threshold quality of the differentiated good, i.e., $\alpha_A^* < \alpha_T^*$, and hence decreases the mass of firms and raises the average quality of the good. Moreover, a decrease in the mass of firms implies that opening to trade induces some knowledge workers (with the lowest abilities among them) to work as production*

workers.

The main focus of the paper is to examine the impact of trade on the wage schedule. It follows from (11) and $\tilde{\pi}_X(\alpha)/\tilde{\pi}_X(\alpha^X) = \alpha/\alpha^X$, together with $\tilde{\pi}_X(\alpha^X) = f_X$, that the equilibrium wage schedule is described by a piecewise linear function:

$$w_T(a) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if} \quad a_0 \leq a < \alpha_T^* \\ \frac{a}{\alpha_T^*} & \text{if} \quad \alpha_T^* \leq a < \alpha^X \\ \frac{a}{\alpha_T^*} + \frac{(a-\alpha^X)f_X}{l\alpha^X} & \text{if} \quad a \geq \alpha^X. \end{cases}$$

Figure 4 shows how the wage schedule changes as a result of opening to trade. The wage schedule in the trade equilibrium shows that there are more production workers (who earn the wage of 1) than before opening to trade, since trade decreases the mass of firms and hence the mass of knowledge workers. That is, workers whose ability lies between α_A^* and α_T^* used to work as knowledge workers but now work as production workers after opening to trade. In the trade equilibrium, workers whose ability is between α_T^* and α^X work as knowledge workers in the firms that serve only their own domestic market. Their wages are lower in the trade equilibrium than in autarky because their firms suffer from increased competition in their domestic market. Workers whose abilities are greater than α^X are the knowledge workers who work in exporting firms. Profits for a firm that barely meets the criterion for exporting are smaller than those in autarky. This is because profits from exporting after paying the fixed costs are not sufficient to offset the loss of domestic sales from the import penetration. Wages for knowledge workers who work in such firms also decline as a result of opening to trade. However, the wages for knowledge workers whose abilities are sufficiently high rise following opening to trade, since trade disproportionately increases the profits for the firms that hire such workers. Trade only increases wages (measured by labor provided by the production workers) for those who are highly talented. Extraordinary talent pays disproportionately well in the globalized world. Such talents are embodied in products sold widely throughout the world.

Proposition 3 *International trade raises the income (measured by labor provided by the production workers) only for those who are most talented.*

Figure 4: Impact of trade on nominal wages

Interpreting this result differently, we obtain the following corollary about the wage gap within firms.

Corollary 1 *As a result of trade liberalization, the wage gap between knowledge workers and production workers within the top-tier firms expands while shrinking within other lower-tier firms, whose operating profits drop as a consequence.*

What is the impact of trade on real wages? Similarly to (8), the worker's indirect utility in the trade equilibrium can be written as

$$u_T(a) = \frac{(\sigma - 1)w_T(a)}{\sigma \left[\int_{\alpha_T^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha)d\alpha + \tau^{1-\sigma} \int_{\alpha^X}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha)d\alpha \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}}. \tag{15}$$

It is easy to see that those who work as production workers both before and after opening to trade benefit from trade. Their real wages increase because the quality index rises due to the intensified competition in the product market while the (nominal) wages are unaffected. It is even more obvious that most talented workers whose (nominal) incomes increase after opening to trade also benefit from trade.

What about the impact on the middle-income class? To derive a clear-cut answer to this question, we assume now that the individual ability follows the Pareto distribution with its cumulative distribution function of $G(a) = 1 - (a_0/a)^k$, where $a_0 > 0$ and $k > 1$.[7] Then,

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[7]It has been documented that both firm size (measured by employment) and upper-tail income distribution can be approximated by the Pareto distribution with its exponent of 1 for the former and 1.5-3 for the latter (e.g., Atkinson, *et al.*, 2011; and Gabaix, 2009). When the ability is distributed according to a Pareto distribution in our model, so are the firm size and the upper-tail income distribution, which justifies our choice of the Pareto as the ability distribution.

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Figure 5: Impact of trade on real wages

it can be shown that under the mild condition $\sigma > 2$, international trade decreases the real wages for the middle-income class, as Figure 5 shows.[8] The proof of the following proposition requires some calculations and is thus relegated to the Appendix.

Proposition 4 *Suppose that there are two symmetric countries in which workers' ability distribution follows a Pareto distribution. Then, the lowest income earners who work as production workers as well as the highest income earners who work as knowledge workers are better off by international trade. Those who belong to the middle-income class, however, experience a decrease in real wages by opening to trade: there is a range of workers' ability such that the real wages of workers whose abilities are within this range fall as a result of opening to trade if and only if $\sigma > 2$ holds. All knowledge workers who work in the firms that only serve their individual domestic markets in the trade equilibrium belong to such middle-income class.*

An individual that belongs to the middle-income class (e.g., knowledge workers with $a \in [\alpha_T^*, \alpha^X]$) benefits from trade as a consumer due to an increase in the quality index, but loses as a residual claimer of the firm, since an increase in the quality index leads to a decrease in the firm's operating profits. The latter effects outweighs the former if and only if $\sigma > 2$, i.e.,

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[8]Many authors have estimated the elasticity of substitution and have reported the estimated values that exceed 2 in most cases; the estimate of the elasticity by Bernard, *et al.* (2003), for example, is 3.79. Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate the elasticities of substitution for different industries at different levels of aggregation for different periods of time. Table IV of their paper shows that during 1990-2001, the simple average of the elasticities of substitution is 6.6 (with an outlier dropped) for five-digit (SITC) industries; it is 4.0 for three-digit (SITC) industries.

the elasticity of substitution is large enough that the latter competition-enhancing effect is dominant.

Having derived the impact of trade on individual workers' real wages, we now turn to the impact on the overall social welfare of each country. We use two measures of social welfare to evaluate the effect of international trade: the utilitarian social welfare and the Lorenz domination. If the ability is distributed according to a Pareto distribution, we have unambiguous results regarding the impact of trade on social welfare in both measures.

The following proposition–the proof of which is relegated to the Appendix–shows that trade unambiguously increases a simple aggregation of individuals' utilities.

Proposition 5 *Suppose that there are two symmetric countries in which workers' ability distribution follows a Pareto distribution. Then, international trade unambiguously improves utilitarian social welfare for individual countries.*

The other measure of social welfare is the Lorenz domination, which is a measure to evaluate the equality of income distribution. We define the Lorenz function by

$$\mathcal{L}(a) = \frac{\int_0^a w(a')dG(a')}{\int_0^\infty w(a')dG(a')},$$

the fraction of total income earned by those who have the ability a or less. We say that the income distribution characterized by the Lorenz function $\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{A}$ is *Lorenz-dominated* by the one characterized by $\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{B}$, if $\mathcal{L}_A(a) \leq \mathcal{L}_B(a)$ for any a with strict inequality for some a.

Proposition 6 *Suppose that there are two symmetric countries in which workers' ability distribution follows a Pareto distribution. Then, the income distribution under international trade is Lorenz-dominated by the one in autarky.*

The Appendix shows the proof of Proposition 6.

Propositions 5 and 6 give us a clear and important message about the impact of international trade on income distribution. International trade benefits a country as a whole, but increases income inequality within the country. This message is reminiscent of the well-known results from the traditional, neoclassical trade theory: international trade benefits all

trading countries but creates winners and losers within them (the Stolper-Samuelson theorem). But there is an important difference. In traditional trade models, trade increases the reward to the factor whose reward has been suppressed due to its abundant supply, while it decreases the reward to the factor that had enjoyed a relatively high reward due to its scarceness. In contrast, our model predicts a widening of the income gap such that the reward to the scarce talent that had already claimed a disproportionately large share of the aggregate income increases even further as a result.

5   Asymmetric Countries

In this section, we extend the baseline model to one where the countries have asymmetric populations or ability distributions. We will show numerically that our main result that only the middle-income class suffers from trade liberalization remains valid also in the case of asymmetric countries. We also show that, among other things, income inequality worsens in both countries as openness to trade increases, but it does so particularly in the smaller country.

We examine the two cases (i) one in which country 1 is larger than country 2 (i.e., $L_1 > L_2$), and (ii) one in which country 1 has relatively more high-ability workers than country 2. The second case is characterized by the first-order stochastic dominance of the Pareto distributions for workers' ability. Specifically, we assume that $k_1 < k_2$ so that $G_1(a) < G_2(a)$ for any $a > a_0$, where $G_i(a) = 1 - (a_0/a)^{k_i}$.

We choose production labor in country 2 as the numeraire. The wage rate for the production workers in country 1, denoted by w, can be different from 1, while in country 2 it equals 1. Throughout this numerical analysis, we select $\sigma = 4$, $l = 1$, $f_X = 1$, and $a_0 = 1$ for concreteness when we show our results graphically. The properties of the equilibrium, however, are robust to changes in parameter values.

The online appendix shows seven equilibrium conditions: free-entry conditions, export-cutoff conditions, and labor-market clearing conditions for the two individual countries, as well as the trade balance condition.

Figure 6. Real wage schedules (Different populations)

Different Population

We first consider the case in which the two countries are different only in population size. We assume that country 1 is larger than country 2: $L_1 = 100$ and $L_2 = 50$. The ability distributions are the same between the two countries: $k_1 = k_2 = 2$.

Figure 6 illustrates the simulation result of the impact of international trade on real wages, measured by the indirect utility given by (8) in the case of autarky and measured similarly in the case of the trade equilibrium when the openness to trade, defined by $\phi = \tau^{1-\sigma}$, equals 0.58 (i.e., $\tau \approx 1.2$). The first observation we want to emphasize is that in both countries, only the middle-income class suffers from opening to trade. That is, the main result from the case of symmetric countries is also valid in this case of asymmetric population size.

As for the comparison between the two countries, we first note that in autarky, the real

wage is higher in country 1 than in country 2 for any ability a. This is because country 1 as the larger country hosts more firms, each of which produces a variety that is slightly different from others, so that the price index is smaller (or equivalently, the quality index is greater) in country 1. This advantage of living in the larger country remains even after opening to trade. We observe (but do not show here) that the wage rate is greater in the larger country 1 than in country 2 (i.e., $w > 1$), which is known as the home market effect (Krugman, 1980, 1991). Together with the observation that the price index is smaller in country 1 than in country 2, the real wage is still higher in country 1 than in country 2 in the trade equilibrium for any ability level. In addition, in all simulations with different parameter values, the results indicate that I_1/w and I_2 take the same values, respectively, throughout a change in $\phi(= \tau^{1-\sigma})$ from 0 to 1. Together with the observation that $w > 1$, this means that international trade creates a (nominal) income gap between the two countries, favoring the larger country.

We also infer from Figure 6 that international trade worsens income inequality, as observed in the symmetric-country case, and it does so more severely for the smaller country. Our model, like Melitz's (2003), possesses the important property that the entry threshold α_i^* increases while the export threshold α_i^X decreases as the openness to trade ϕ increases, even when the countries are asymmetric. Compared with the case of autarky, in particular, the entry threshold in the trade equilibrium is higher and the (nominal) wage schedule shifts in both countries as indicated in Figure 4. Together with the observation that the values of I_1/w and I_2 do not change by opening to trade, this means that the same logic as used in the proof of Proposition 6 (in the Appendix) applies here, and we can conclude that the income distribution under international trade is again Lorenz-dominated by the one in autarky, even in this case. This logic can also be applied to the difference between the countries in assessing the effect of opening to trade. As Figure 6 indicates, $\alpha_1^* < \alpha_2^*$ and $\alpha_1^X > \alpha_2^X$ in the trade equilibrium. The larger country 1 has a larger market than country 2 not just because of its size but also because of the greater equilibrium wage rate. Consequently, country 1 can accommodate more lower-quality firms (both domestic and foreign) than country 2–i.e.,

Figure 7. Difference in the Lorenz curves (Different populations)

$\alpha_1^* < \alpha_2^*$ and $\alpha_2^X < \alpha_1^X$ – which in turn means that the proportions of both lowest and highest income groups are larger in country 2 than in country 1. Thus, we infer that the smaller country 2's income inequality worsens compared with country 1's in the sense of the Lorenz domination. This observation is confirmed by Figure 7, which illustrates the vertical difference between the Lorenz curve in the trade equilibrium and that in autarky, i.e., the income share in the trade equilibrium minus that in autarky, for countries 1 and 2.

Finally, we find that the income inequality monotonically worsens in both countries as the openness to trade increases, as expected from the observation that α_i^* increases while α_i^X decreases with ϕ. Figure 8 shows that the Gini coefficients increase in both countries as ϕ (the openness to trade) increases.[9] Moreover, the smaller country 2 always experiences greater income inequality than the larger country 1. International trade entails job polarization, which exacerbates income inequality. The smaller the country, the stronger the effect.

A simple empirical analysis using the data from the OECD countries in the period of 1979-2014 gives a weak support of this finding. As shown in the online appendix, we regress a change in the Gini coefficient on a change in the total value of the country's international trade and the interaction term of the total value of trade with the country size, measured

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[9]All firms in country 2 export their products (i.e., $a_2^* = a_2^X$), when the openness to trade is greater than $\phi = 0.76$ (i.e., $\tau \approx 1.10$). We observe that country 2's threshold ability $a_2^*(= a_2^X)$ and hence its Gini coefficient remain the same, respectively, beyond that critical level of openness.

Figure 8. Gini coefficients (Different populations)

by population. The regression result, based on column (4) in the appendix table (which includes both country and year fixed effects), indicates that trade increases income inequality but less so in larger countries, as predicted in the model. However, none of these effects are statistically significant even at the 10% level.[10]

Different Ability Distributions

We turn to the case where the two countries are different only in their ability distribution. We report the findings here when $k_1 = 3$ and $k_2 = 4$: country 1 has relatively more workers with high abilities than country 2. We assume that the two countries have the same population: $L_1 = L_2 = 100$.

Similarly to the case of population asymmetry, only the middle-income class suffers from trade in both countries, as Figure 9 shows. We also observe that the real wage for production workers is greater in the talent-abundant country 1 than in country 2, regardless of whether the two countries engage in trade. This is because country 1 has more firms that produce high-quality goods than country 2, so that demands for production workers are higher. When we compare knowledge workers with the same ability, however, their real wages are higher in

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[10]Alternatively, we may use the 90-10 percentile wage ratio instead of the Gini coefficient to measure income inequality, or use the GDP instead of population to measure the size of the countries. The data availability, especially for one that measures income inequality, limits the power of rejecting the null hypothesis.

Figure 9. Real-wage schedules (Different abilities)

country 2 due to its scarcity of talent; the (nominal) wage for production workers is lower in country 2 than in country 1 so that the firms in the former earn more operating profits than their counterparts in the latter. We emphasize here that the fact that knowledge workers with the same ability earns more in country 2 than in country 1 does not mean that country 2 is wealthier than country 1. Indeed, as Figure 10 indicates, the (nominal) wage is higher in the talent-abundant country 1 than in country 2 at any percentile of individuals, reflecting the difference in the ability distributions; individuals at the 90th percentile, for example, have the ability $a = 2.15$ and earn $w = 1.24$ in country 1 while their counterparts have the ability $a = 1.77$ and earn $w = 1.14$ in country 2.

Again, international trade exacerbates income inequality within the countries; Figure 11 indicates that in both countries, the income distribution under the trade equilibrium when $\phi = 0.58$ is Lorenz-dominated by that in autarky. Indeed, as Figure 12 shows, income inequality, measured by Gini coefficient, worsens in both countries as the openness to trade increases.[11] Figure 12 also indicates that talent-abundant country 1 always experiences greater income inequality, as a consequence of a thicker talented population that earns disproportionately high incomes.

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[11]We observe $a_2^* = a_2^X$ when $\phi \geq 0.98$ (i.e., τ is approximately less than 1.01). In such cases, the entry threshold and hence the Gini coefficient are the same, respectively, over different values of ϕ.

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Figure 10. Wage Schedule over percentiles (Different abilities)

Figure 11. Difference the Lorenz curves (Different abilities)

Figure 12. Gini coefficients (Different abilities)

6 Conclusion

In order to examine the impact of international trade on income inequality across workers with different abilities, we have built a two-country trade model in which the average ability of knowledge workers determines the quality of the product that the firm produces. Knowledge workers are sorted into firms according to their abilities, which entails firm heterogeneity in product quality. International trade benefits the firms that produce high-quality products, while it decreases the profits for those that barely export their products and those that serve only their individual domestic markets. Consequently, income inequality expands among knowledge workers, the residual claimers of the firms' profits. International trade increases the real wages for top income earners and for lowest income earners, who benefit from a resulting fall of the price index, while it decreases those for the middle-income class.

We have deliberately designed the model as simply as possible in order to highlight what we believe are the important factors in explaining why globalization entails job and wage polarization especially in developed countries: the winner-take-all market and the war for talent. For that purpose, we have made some simplifying assumptions, such as (i) firms are required to hire only a fixed number of knowledge workers; and (ii) production workers' productivity does not vary with their abilities. Some of our results would surely be modified

if we relax these assumptions.

In the online appendix, for example, we have analyzed the case in which production workers' productivity varies with their abilities. In such cases, the wage inequality naturally arises among production workers, as well as among knowledge workers. We have shown that our main message that trade entails wage polarization also remains valid in the extended model as long as productivity is only modestly dependent on ability. If the ability significantly affects their productivity, however, everyone will benefit from trade including workers in the middle-income. This result is not very surprising because in such cases the wage increases along with ability almost linearly for the entire population of workers, so that the difference between knowledge and production workers is minimal, and so that occupational change from the former to the latter does not lead to a large wage decline.

We have abstracted from the differential effects of international trade on individuals' real wages through its impact on the relative prices for goods. Broda and Romalis (2009) document that the relative prices of low-quality products, which tend to be more often consumed by the poor, decline in the US during 1994-2005. Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) estimate a non-homothetic gravity equation derived from a non-homothetic demand system and show that trade typically favors the poor, who spend relatively more on traded goods. We have theoretically derived the result where the lowest-income earners benefit from trade due to a trade-induced decline in the effective price index of their consumption basket, which provides another reason (complementary to the above empirical findings) why the lowest-income earners are likely to benefit from trade. Moreover, trade induces the firms that produce lowest-quality products to exit the market and hence raises the average quality of products even for lowest-income earners who may consume relatively more low-quality products. Of course, for a rigorous analysis of the impact of trade on heterogeneous individuals with different consumption behavior, we need to adopt non-homothetic preferences, as Fajgelbaum *et al.* (2011) does in order to analyze the impact of trade when goods are vertically as well as horizontally differentiated. Their framework, together with the aforementioned extended model illustrated in the online appendix, would also allow us to analyze further

interaction between production and consumption sides when knowledge workers have comparative advantage in raising product quality while consuming high-quality products more than lower-income earners. We leave such an extension as an important issue for future research.

Our basic message remains largely valid even if we accommodate those features in the model. Globalization has created the opportunity for firms to reach people all over the world. Top-tier firms are the main beneficiaries of the globalization since the resulting increases in sale and profits are large. But other firms are likely to lose because of foreign top-tier firms' penetration in their own markets. These differential impacts of globalization on firms directly entail differential impacts on wages of knowledge workers as residual claimers. The most talented workers who work in top-tier exporting firms benefit from globalization, earning higher real wages than before. Those who are mediocre knowledge workers are likely to lose; their firms may suffer from increased competition in their domestic markets, or they may even drop out of a knowledge-worker pool.

Appendix

Proof of Proposition 4. First, we prove that international trade makes the production workers better off by showing that the product quality index increases (or equivalently, the price index drops) by trade. Then, we show that trade also makes top income earners better off. Finally, we derive the condition under which there exist workers with intermediate abilities, such that their real wages fall as a result of opening to trade.

To calculate the utility in autarky (expressed by (8)) and its counterpart in the trade equilibrium, we first derive the product quality indices as

$$\int_{\alpha_A^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha = \frac{ka_0^k L}{l} \int_{\alpha_A^*}^{\infty} \alpha^{-k} d\alpha = \frac{ka_0^k L}{(k-1)l\alpha_A^{*k-1}} \tag{16}$$

in autarky, and

$$\int_{\alpha_T^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha + \tau^{1-\sigma} \int_{\frac{\tau^{\sigma-1}f_X}{l}\alpha_T^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha = \frac{ka_0^k L}{(k-1)l\alpha_T^{*k-1}} \left[1 + \tau^{k(1-\sigma)} \left(\frac{l}{f_X} \right)^{k-1} \right] \tag{17}$$

in the trade equilibrium.

Now, we solve the autarkic FE and LM equations, (6) and (7), for α_A^* and I_A. Substituting the expression of (16) into (6), we obtain the aggregate income in autarky as

$$I_A = \frac{\sigma l}{\alpha_A^*} \times \frac{ka_0^k L}{(k-1)l\alpha_A^{*k-1}} = \frac{\sigma k L}{k-1} \left(\frac{a_0}{\alpha_A^*} \right)^k. \tag{18}$$

Then, we substitute (18) into (7) to obtain

$$l \times \frac{L}{l} \left(\frac{a_0}{\alpha_A^*} \right)^k + \left(\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} \right) \frac{\sigma k L}{k-1} \left(\frac{a_0}{\alpha_A^*} \right)^k = L$$

$$L \left(\frac{a_0}{\alpha_A^*} \right)^k \left(\frac{\sigma k - 1}{k-1} \right) = L,$$

which gives us

$$\alpha_A^* = a_0 \left(\frac{\sigma k - 1}{k-1} \right)^{\frac{1}{k}}. \tag{19}$$

Note that $\alpha_A^* > a_0$ holds because $\sigma > 1$. We also obtain I_A by substituting (19) back to (18):

$$I_A = \frac{\sigma k L}{k-1} \times \frac{k-1}{\sigma k - 1} = \frac{\sigma k L}{\sigma k - 1}. \tag{20}$$

Let us turn to the trade equilibrium. Substituting the expression of (17) into the FE condition (13), we obtain the aggregate income in the trade equilibrium as

$$I_T = \frac{\sigma k L}{k-1} \left(\frac{a_0}{\alpha_T^*}\right)^k \left[1 + \tau^{k(1-\sigma)} \left(\frac{l}{f_X}\right)^{k-1}\right]. \tag{21}$$

Then, we substitute (21) into the LM condition (14) to obtain

$$l \times \frac{L}{l} \left(\frac{a_0}{\alpha_T^*}\right)^k + f_X \times \frac{L}{l} \left(\frac{\alpha_0}{\alpha_T^*}\right)^k \left(\frac{l}{\tau^{\sigma-1} f_X}\right)^k$$
$$+ \left(\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}\right) \frac{\sigma k L}{k-1} \left(\frac{a_0}{\alpha_T^*}\right)^k \left[1 + \tau^{k(1-\sigma)} \left(\frac{l}{f_X}\right)^{k-1}\right] = L,$$

which is reduced to

$$L \left(\frac{a_0}{\alpha_T^*}\right)^k \left[1 + \tau^{k(1-\sigma)} \left(\frac{l}{f_X}\right)^{k-1}\right] \left(\frac{\sigma k - 1}{k-1}\right) = L.$$

Thus, we have

$$\alpha_T^* = a_0 \left[1 + \tau^{k(1-\sigma)} \left(\frac{l}{f_X}\right)^{k-1}\right]^{\frac{1}{k}} \left(\frac{\sigma k - 1}{k-1}\right)^{\frac{1}{k}}. \tag{22}$$

Substituting (22) back to (21), we obtain

$$I_T = \frac{\sigma k L}{k-1} \times \frac{k-1}{\sigma k - 1} \times \left[1 + \tau^{k(1-\sigma)} \left(\frac{l}{f_X}\right)^{k-1}\right]^{-1} \times \left[1 + \tau^{k(1-\sigma)} \left(\frac{l}{f_X}\right)^{k-1}\right]$$
$$= \frac{\sigma k L}{\sigma k - 1}. \tag{23}$$

It is immediate from (20) and (23) that $I_A = I_T$.

Since the production workers' wage is normalized to 1, it is obvious from (8) and (15) that they are better off by opening to trade if and only if the quality index increases by trade, i.e.,

$$\int_{\alpha_T^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha + \tau^{1-\sigma} \int_{\frac{\tau^{\sigma-1} f_X}{l} \alpha_T^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha > \int_{\alpha_A^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha. \tag{24}$$

Now, it follows from (16) and (19) that

$$\int_{\alpha_A^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha = \frac{k a_0 L}{(k-1)l} \left(\frac{k-1}{\sigma k - 1}\right)^{\frac{k-1}{k}}. \tag{25}$$

Similarly, we obtain from (17) and (22) that

$$\int_{\alpha_T^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha + \tau^{1-\sigma} \int_{\frac{\tau^{\sigma-1} f_X}{l} \alpha_T^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha$$

$$= \frac{k a_0 L}{(k-1)l} \left(\frac{k-1}{\sigma k - 1}\right)^{\frac{k-1}{k}} \left[1 + \tau^{k(1-\sigma)} \left(\frac{l}{f_X}\right)^{k-1}\right]^{\frac{1}{k}}. \tag{26}$$

The direct comparison between (25) and (26) reveals that (24) holds, and hence the production workers are made better off by international trade.

Next, we show that the highest income earners are better off by opening to trade. As Figure 5 suggests, we need only show that $u_T'(a) > u_A'(a)$ for $a > \alpha^X$. Since $w_A(a) = \tilde{\pi}(a)/l$ for $a \geq \alpha_A^*$, where $\tilde{\pi}$ is defined by (5), and $w_T(a) = [\tilde{\pi}_d(a) + \tilde{\pi}_X(a) - f_X]/l$ for $a \geq \alpha^X$, we obtain from (5), (8), (9), (10), and (15) that

$$u_A(a) = \frac{(\sigma - 1) a I_A}{l \sigma^2 \left[\int_{\alpha_A^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha\right]^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma-1}}} \quad \text{for } a \geq \alpha_A^*, \tag{27}$$

$$u_T(a) = \frac{\sigma - 1}{l \sigma \left[\int_{\alpha_T^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha + \tau^{1-\sigma} \int_{\alpha^X}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}}$$

$$\times \left\{\frac{a(1 + \tau^{1-\sigma}) I_T}{\sigma \left[\int_{\alpha_T^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha + \tau^{1-\sigma} \int_{\alpha^X}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha\right]} - f_X\right\} \quad \text{for } a \geq \alpha^X. \tag{28}$$

Note that the higher the product quality index, the higher a knowledge worker's utility in both autarky and trade, when $1 < \sigma < 2$. The higher the quality index, the better off a knowledge worker will be as a consumer, but the worse off they will be as a residual claimer of a firm that competes with other firms. The former effect outweighs the latter if and only if $\sigma < 2$, i.e., the elasticity of substitution is small enough that there is only a small negative impact of an increase in the quality index on the firm's operating profits.

Now, it follows from (27) and (28) that we have $u_T'(a) > u_A'(a)$ if and only if

$$\left[\frac{\int_{\alpha_T^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha + \tau^{1-\sigma} \int_{\alpha^X}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha}{\int_{\alpha_A^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha}\right]^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma-1}} < 1 + \tau^{1-\sigma},$$

where we have used $I_A = I_T$. The expression in the square brackets on the left-hand side is greater than 1, as we have shown above. Thus, this inequality is satisfied if $\sigma \leq 2$. To see if

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this inequality is also satisfied even if $\sigma > 2$, we rewrite this inequality using (12), (16), and (17) as

$$\left[\left(\frac{\alpha_A^*}{\alpha_T^*}\right)^{k-1} + \left(\frac{\alpha_A^*}{\alpha^X}\right)^{k-1}\tau^{1-\sigma}\right]^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma-1}} < 1 + \tau^{1-\sigma}. \tag{29}$$

Now, it follows from $\alpha_A^* < \alpha_T^* < \alpha^X$ and $k > 1$ that

$$\left(\frac{\alpha_A^*}{\alpha_T^*}\right)^{k-1} + \left(\frac{\alpha_A^*}{\alpha^X}\right)^{k-1}\tau^{1-\sigma} < 1 + \tau^{1-\sigma}.$$

Since $0 < (\sigma - 2)/(\sigma - 1) < 1$ when $\sigma > 2$ and $(\alpha_A^*/\alpha_T^*)^{k-1} + (\alpha_A^*/\alpha^X)^{k-1}\tau^{1-\sigma} > 1$ (which is equivalent to (24)), we have

$$\left[\left(\frac{\alpha_A^*}{\alpha_T^*}\right)^{k-1} + \left(\frac{\alpha_A^*}{\alpha^X}\right)^{k-1}\tau^{1-\sigma}\right]^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma-1}} < \left(\frac{\alpha_A^*}{\alpha_T^*}\right)^{k-1} + \left(\frac{\alpha_A^*}{\alpha^X}\right)^{k-1}\tau^{1-\sigma} < 1 + \tau^{1-\sigma},$$

so that we have shown that (29) holds, and hence that the higher income earners benefit from trade regardless of the value of $\sigma \in (1, \infty)$.

Finally, we derive the condition under which the middle-income earners are made worse off by trade. In the trade equilibrium, the utility of a knowledge worker with $a \in (\alpha_T^*, \alpha^X)$ can be written as

$$u_T(a) = \frac{(\sigma - 1)aI_T}{l\sigma^2 \left[\int_{\alpha_T^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha)d\alpha + \tau^{1-\sigma}\int_{\alpha^X}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha)d\alpha\right]^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma-1}}}.$$

Using $I_A = I_T$, we compare this utility with $u_A(a)$, shown in (27), to find that $u_A(a) > u_T(a)$ for $a \in (\alpha_T^*, \alpha^X)$ if and only if

$$\left[\int_{\alpha_A^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha)d\alpha\right]^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma-1}} < \left[\int_{\alpha_T^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha)d\alpha + \tau^{1-\sigma}\int_{\alpha^X}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha)d\alpha\right]^{\frac{\sigma-2}{\sigma-1}}.$$

It follows from (24) that this inequality holds, and hence opening to trade makes the middle-income class worse off, if and only if $\sigma > 2$.

Proof of Proposition 5. It follows directly from (8) and (15) that each country's utilitarian

social welfare can be written as

$$SW_A = \frac{(\sigma - 1)I_A}{\sigma \left[\int_{\alpha_A^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}},$$

$$SW_T = \frac{(\sigma - 1)I_T}{\sigma \left[\int_{\alpha_T^*}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha + \tau^{1-\sigma} \int_{\alpha^X}^{\infty} \alpha f(\alpha) d\alpha\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}}.$$

Thus, trade improves utilitarian social welfare if and only if

$$\frac{I_A}{\left[\int_{\alpha_A^*}^{\infty} \alpha' f(\alpha') d\alpha'\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}} < \frac{I_T}{\left[\int_{\alpha_T^*}^{\infty} \alpha' f(\alpha') d\alpha' + \tau^{1-\sigma} \int_{\tau^{\sigma-1}\frac{f_X}{l}\alpha_T^*}^{\infty} \alpha' f(\alpha') d\alpha'\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}},$$

which is satisfied since $I_A = I_T$, as shown in the proof of Proposition 4, and the product quality index is greater in the trade equilibrium than in autarky, as shown in (24).

Proof of Proposition 6. Recall that the equilibrium wage schedules in autarky and in trade are given by

$$w_A(a) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{for} & a \in [0, \alpha_A^*) \\ \frac{a}{\alpha_A^*} & \text{for} & \alpha \in [\alpha_A^*, \infty) \end{cases}$$

and

$$w_T(a) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{for} & a \in [0, \alpha_T^*) \\ \frac{a}{\alpha_T^*} & \text{for} & a \in [\alpha_T^*, \alpha^X) \\ \frac{a}{\alpha_T^*} + \frac{(a - \alpha^X)f_X}{l\alpha^X} & \text{for} & a \in [\alpha^X, \infty), \end{cases}$$

respectively. It follows from $\alpha_A^* < \alpha_T^* < \alpha^X$ that there exists $\bar{\alpha}$ $(> \alpha^X)$ such that (i) $w_T(\bar{\alpha}) = w_A(\bar{\alpha})$; (ii) $w_T(\alpha) \leq w_A(\alpha)$ for all $\alpha \leq \bar{\alpha}$; and (iii) $w_T(\alpha) > w_A(\alpha)$ for all $\alpha > \bar{\alpha}$, as depicted in Figure 4. This implies that $\mathcal{L}_A(a) = \mathcal{L}_T(a)$ for all $a \leq \alpha_A^*$, and $\mathcal{L}_A(a) > \mathcal{L}_T(a)$ for all $a > \alpha_A^*$, since $w_A(a) = w_T(a) = 1$ for $a \leq \alpha_A^*$ and $\int_0^{\infty} w_A(a)dG(a) = \int_0^{\infty} w_T(a)dG(a)$, which is shown in the proof of Proposition 4 as $I_A = I_T$. Thus, the income distribution under international trade is Lorenz-dominated by the one in autarky.

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